Recent developments in California law make it easier for courts to terminate the rights of parents whose children are in a legal guardianship. Whether that's good or bad will probably depend on your perspective. Grandparents trying to protect a grandchild from a cruel or abusive parent will probably hail the recent development as a boon to grandparents' rights. But parents in a period of difficulty who are considering whether to leave a child in the custody of a legal guardian may see this as a terrifying slippery slope to losing parental rights. I have seen people on both sides of that divide and can confidently say that there is rarely an easy solution. But people should know the law that affects their rights, so I want to explain the situation.
First, before I say any more, please remember that nothing I write here is intended as legal advice and you should not take it as legal advice. Your situation is unique and if you need legal assistance or guidance then you should contact an attorney in your area. If you are in the central San Joaquin Valley and would like to meet with me, my office is in Fresno. To set an appointment for a consultation, please contact my firm through its website.
A Little Background
To understand the importance of the recent development, you need a little background knowledge. Before a child can be adopted, the parents must consent to the adoption or their parental rights must be terminated. The California Family Code lists several grounds for termination of parental rights, such as abandonment, neglect or cruel treatment, that the parent has been convicted of a felony that demonstrates his or her unfitness as a parent, or that the parent is developmentally disabled or or mentally ill. (There are other grounds for termination, but those are probably the most commonly used, that I have seen.) When someone wants to adopt a child without the consent of one or more parents, he or she can file a petition with the court alleging one or more of those grounds. Common situations are where the child's caretaker wishes to adopt and the parents do not consent, or where a stepparent wishes to adopt, and the non-custodial parent will not consent.
In 2003, the Legislature added a section to the California Probate Code (section 1516.5) to establish a new ground for terminating the rights of parents whose children are in the custody of a legal guardian. Under the new section, if one or both parents do not have legal custody, the child has been in the physical custody of the legal guardian for at least two years, and it would benefit the child to be adopted by the the legal guardian, the guardian can ask the court to terminate the rights of the parents.
If that seems to you like a surprisingly easy way to lose parental rights, you are not alone. Two different parents recently challenged the constitutionality of section 1516.5. They argued, in different ways, that since parents have a "fundamental liberty interest" in the care, control, custody, and companionship of their minor children, a court cannot terminate their parental rights without finding the parents to be "unfit." Since section 1516.5 does not require a finding of "unfitness," they argued, it violates due process under the United States Constitution. In other words, they argued that section 1516.5 made it too easy for the court to terminate their parental rights. In a pair of opinions issued on March 19, 2009—Guardianship of Ann S. and In re Charlotte D.—the California Supreme Court disagreed.
Before I explain any further, it is important to understand that the guardianship must be a legal one before Probate Code section 1516.5 comes into play. Termination of parental rights under section 1516.5 is not available for children who have been left with a relative or a caretaker in an informal guardianship. When I say "legal guardianship," I am talking about what is also called "probate guardianship," because the Probate Code provides the statutory basis for establishing the guardianship.
Guardianship of Ann S.
In Ann S., a mother with major substance abuse problems agreed to let another couple have legal guardianship of her 18-month-old daughter, Ann, with no visitation rights. Not long after, she pled guilty to a felony theft charge and received a 32-month prison sentence. While she was incarcerated, the guardians filed a petition to adopt Ann, but the mother refused to consent. So they tried to terminate her parental rights on the ground of abandonment or conviction of a felony demonstrating unfitness, but the court said no. All of that was before January 1, 2004, when section 1516.5 became effective. So in February 2004, after discovering this new ground for termination of parental rights, the guardians tried again, this time under section 1516.5. The court granted their petition to terminate parental rights and the mother appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the termination and the mother petitioned the California Supreme Court for review of the ruling.
Here is one paragraph from the Supreme Court's opinion in Ann S. that explains the outcome pretty clearly:
Mother argues that section 1516.5 is unconstitutional because it permits the termination of parental rights based only on the child's best interest. She contends due process requries a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is presently unfit, or that terminating parental rights is the least detrimental alternative for the child. Her claims are based on a parent's fundamnetal interest in "the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children." [Citations.] It is noteworthy, however, that while mothre invokes the due process protections courts have developed to protect this interest, she is not seeking to obtain the interest here. Neither she nor any other parent in a section 1516.5 proceeding has or stands to gain the companionship, care, custody, or management of the child. If the mother defeats the effort to terminate her parental rights, the guardianship continues and those rights remain in a state of suspension.
In other words, when the mother agreed to the guardianship of her child, she essentially gave up her interest in parenting that child, leaving nothing to be protected by requiring a finding of unfitness, and making the best interest of the child the only thing that matters. As the Court pointed out a little later, in footnote 16 of its opinion, "Section 1516.5 has made the eventual termination of parental rights a potential consequence of establishing a probate guardianship[.]" More on that below.
The main holding of Ann S. is that California Probate Code section 1516.5 is "facially constitutional," meaning that it has no inherent constitutional defects, but that individual parents may challenge it on the grounds that applying it to them, in their particular circumstances, would be unconstitutional. (Lawyers and legal scholars call that an "as-applied challenge" because people who raise such a challenge are only saying the law is unconstitutional as applied to them.)
The mother in Ann S. also argued that section 1516.5 should not be applied to her because she agreed to the guardianship before that section became effective. But section 3 of the California Probate Code says that new provisions of the Probate Code affect "all matters governed by the new law, regardless of whether an event occurred or circumstance existed before, on, or after the operative date," unless making a new law applicable to something that happened before it became effective would "substantially interfere with . . . the rights of the parties or other interested persons in connection with an event that occurred or circumstance that existed before the opperative date"—in which case the court can choose whether to apply the old or new law. So the Supreme Court looked at the mother's situation to decide whether the exception should apply. No such luck. First, the mother only said she "probably" would not have consented to the guardianship if section 1516.5 had been effective. Second, the mother's severe substance abuse problems probably would have resulted in a juvenile dependency proceeding even if she had not consented to the guardianship. One way or another, the Supreme Court said, this mother was going to lose her daughter, so there was no point in not applying the new law.
In re Charlotte D.
In Charlotte D., a father argued that section 1516.5 should not apply to him because terminating his parental rights without finding that he was "unfit" would be unconstitutional under Adoption of Kelsey S., a California Supreme Court opinion from 1992.
In Kelsey S., the Court held that if a mother who wanted to give her child up for adoption prevented the father from coming forward and establishing his fatherhood in order to keep him from becoming a "presumed father" under California law—which means his consent would be required for an adoption—then if the father "sufficiently and timely demonstrated a full commitment to his parental responsibilities," the court could not allow the adoption without his consent unless it found that he was unfit. In other words, if a mother could keep the father of her child from getting involved, then she could give the child up for adoption but the father would have no way to protect his parental rights. Essentially, the mother could unilaterally decide that the father would have no right to be a parent, which gives mothers more rights than unwed fathers. That, said the Court, violated unwed fathers' right to equal protection and due process.
But in Charlotte D., the Supreme Court said that Kelsey S. did not apply, first because the mother had not prevented the father from asserting his rights, and second because section 1516.5 "does not prescribe a different standard for terminating the rights of natural fathers than it does for mothers or presumed fathers." The Court did suggest, however, that it is "conceivable that a parent faced with the termination of his or her rights under section 1516.5 would be in a position to assert a due process claim based on a showing analogous to the one we outlined in Kelsey S." In other words, "[i]t seems unlikely that a court would find it in a child's best interest under section 1516.5 to terminate the rights of a fully committed, responsible, and capable parent who finds an extended probate guardianship unavoidable under exigent circumstances." But the father in Charlotte D. did not meet that standard, so the Court affirmed the termination of his parental rights under section 1516.5.
What does all of this mean?
Put simply, legal guardians can adopt the children in their custody relatively easily, without the consent of the children's parents, by bringing a petition to terminate parental rights under Probate Code section 1516.5. This is especially important for many grandparents who have established legal guardianship of their grandchildren. Now they have a clear path to adopting those children and putting away their fears that the parents will one day return and make legal trouble for them. Essentially, after two years of legal guardianship, the guardians only need to show that adoption is in the children's best interest and the court can terminate parental rights.
From the other side of the coin, however, these cases highlight the continued development of our law and society away from the importance of parental rights and toward the goal of ensuring that children have caretakers who serve their "best interest." Our laws are more interested in making sure that children have a stable home life than in preserving the biological or emotional ties of parents to their children. We have spent the last few decades upping the ante for parents. We recognize those biological and emotional ties, but parents who are not zealous in maintaining those ties and taking seriously the job of parenting stand to lose their parental rights very easily.
As a practical matter, these cases mean that when a parent consents to the legal guardianship of his or her child, the clock starts ticking. Two years later, if that guardianship is still in effect and the parent has done nothing to demonstrate that he or she is "a fully committed, responsible, and capable parent who finds an extended probate guardianship unavoidable under exigent circumstances," then the rights of that parent will be hanging by a thread. A petition under Probate Code section 1516.5 is all it will take to snip the thread. Since termination of parental rights is a potential consequence of consenting to legal guardianship, parents should look at legal guardianship only as a temporary status. Otherwise, it is the beginning of the end. Parents who find themselves in those exigent circumstances that necessitate a legal guardianship should recognize those circumstances as a signal to make major and immediate changes in their lifestyle if they want to keep their kids.
We can argue the wisdom of this tendency—and I'll be the first to express unease with where we seem to be headed—but this is the law for now. The moral of the story is simple: if you want to have children and you want to keep your children, then you need to be a good parent. Criminal, abusive, or addictive behaviors are not good for you, they are not good for your children, and, depending on your circumstances, they may just give the government a means to oust you from your parental role. Parents do have rights, but when then take those rights for granted and trample all over them with bad behavior, the courts will not be impressed and those rights are likely to be terminated.
Finally, as I said above, nothing I write here is intended as legal advice and it should not be taken as legal advice. I do not know your unique situation. If you would like to set an appointment for a consultation, please contact my firm through its website.